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This paper provides estimates of the impact that removing all merchandise trade 
distortions (including agricultural subsidies) would have on food and agricultural 
production, trade and incomes. Using the latest versions of the GTAP database and the 
World Bank’s LINKAGE model of the global economy (projected to 2015), our results 
suggest farm employment, the real value of agricultural output and exports, the real 
returns to farm land and unskilled labor, and real net farm incomes would all rise 
substantially in developing country regions with a move to free merchandise trade, 
thereby alleviating rural poverty – despite the decline in international terms of trade for 
developing countries that are net food importers or are enjoying preferential access to 
agricultural markets of high-income countries.  
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  To what extent are government trade and subsidy policies still distorting agricultural 
markets and farmers’ incentives around the world? Nearly two decades ago a major World Bank 
study addressed that question for 18 developing countries (Krueger, Schiff and Valdes 1988), 
and found that farmers in those countries were discriminated against by their governments’ 
policies, albeit less so directly than indirectly (via restrictions on imports of industrial products 
and overvalued exchange rates). Another study at that time focused on time series data for 
developed and newly industrializing countries, and found a tendency for national governments to 
gradually change from taxing to subsidizing agricultural relative to industrial production (and 
from subsidizing to taxing food consumers) in the course of their economic development, and at 
an earlier stage the weaker an economy’s comparative advantage in agriculture (Anderson and 
Hayami 1986).   
Meanwhile the OECD Secretariat has been estimating direct producer supports by its 
member governments, and finds that they all support their farmers and that the aggregate degree 
of support is high and has not fallen over the past fifteen years (Legg 2003, OECD 2005) – 
having risen substantially over earlier post-World War II decades when manufacturing protection 
began falling to what are now very low levels in those countries. That is, developing countries’ 
policies of the past had caused international prices of farm products to be above what they 
otherwise would have been, while the policies of high-income countries had the opposite effect. 






they almost exactly offset each other in terms of their impact on international prices of temperate 
foods, while more than halving the volume of international food trade (Tyers and Anderson 
1992, Table 6.9). Hence developing country farmers and agricultural production at that time 
were clearly discriminated against by the patterns of distortions across sectors and regions. 
Since the 1980s, however, a number of major policy changes have occurred. Many 
developing countries have been reforming their trade and subsidy regimes unilaterally; 
innumerable preferential trading arrangements (some reciprocal, others non-reciprocal) have 
been signed and have led to sub-global or discriminatory trade liberalization that may or may not 
have improved global welfare; the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, begun in 
1986, came to a successful conclusion in 1994 and by end-2004 the agreed reforms were fully 
implemented; and the World Trade Organization (WTO) came into being to replace the GATT 
Secretariat on 1 January 1995 and since then its membership has grown by 20 to almost 150 
customs territories, with new members (especially China) committing to significant reforms as 
the price of admission (Crawford and Fiorentino 2005; World Bank 2002, 2004, 2005; Drabek 
and Bacchetta 2004).  
By the mid-1990s it appeared to one group of analysts that, for the sample of fifteen 
developing countries they examined, the problem of an anti-agricultural bias in those countries’ 
trade and sectoral policies had all but disappeared (Jensen, Robinson and Tarp 2002). But what 
about in other developing countries? And are some developing countries overshooting and 
adopting the potentially equally wasteful agricultural protectionist stance of more-advanced 
economies?  
To answer these questions requires extending the time series of estimates of distortions in 






is the focus of a new research project getting under way at the World Bank. But in the meantime 
it is possible to answer the question in the title of the present paper using a new database for 
2001. Specifically, here we address the question: What would be the consequences for 
agricultural markets and farm incomes if all countries were to reduce their trade distortions 
simultaneously (as in an ambitious WTO round), as distinct from just reducing their own 
distortions?
1  
That is, the aim of this paper is to make use of a new database and a global general 
equilibrium model to assess how agricultural markets and value added in agriculture would 
change if, over the next decade, the world were to remove all merchandise trade barriers and 
agricultural subsidies. While no-one anticipates such a radical reform, the analysis serves as a 
benchmark to suggest what is at stake in the WTO’s current round of multilateral trade 
negotiations – as well as in further unilateral reforms. It can also give a better indication of 
agricultural comparative advantages around the world than is available by looking at indicators 
in the current distortion-ridden situation. 
Specifically, we make use of the World Bank’s recursive dynamic model of the global 
economy known as LINKAGE (van der Mensbrugghe 2004), which has formed the basis for the 
World Bank’s standard decade-long projections of the global economy and of its earlier trade 
analysis (e.g., World Bank 2002, 2004). The distinction is made in our welfare results between 
effects of moving to free trade by developing countries versus by high-income countries, and in 
agriculture as compared with non-agricultural sectors. We also make use of the latest GTAP 
                                                 
1   The Krueger, Schiff and Valdes (1988) and Jensen, Robinson and Tarp (2002) studies focused on effects of just 
own-country policies, the first using partial equilibrium and the second using national general equilibrium 






database (Version 6.05, see www.gtap.org) which has the virtue of including not only reciprocal 
but also non-reciprocal preferential tariffs, the latter providing low-income exporters duty-free 
access to protected high-income country markets. This allows us to take into account the fact that 
reform may cause a decline in the international terms of trade for those developing countries that 
are enjoying preferential access to agricultural markets of high-income countries (in addition to 
those that are net food importers because their comparative advantage is in other sectors such as 
labor-intensive manufacturing). 
The paper begins with an examination of current distortions, the emphasis being mainly 
on import tariffs since they are later shown to be far more important than agricultural subsidies. 
This is followed by a description of the LINKAGE model of the global economy to be used to 
analyze the consequences of removing those distortions. The key results of the simulations are 
then presented. After discussing some qualifications, the paper concludes by highlighting the key 
messages and drawing out implications for developing countries in particular. 
 
Key distortions in global markets 
 
Border measures traditionally have been the main means by which governments distort 
prices in their domestic markets for products, with the price of tradables relative to nontradables 
affected by interventions in the market for foreign exchange, and the relative prices of the 
various tradables affected by trade taxes-cum-subsidies or quantitative trade restrictions. 
Multiple exchange rates have also altered relative prices among tradable products. Product-
specific domestic producer or consumer subsidies have played a more limited role (because of 






agriculture. With the freeing up of most foreign exchange markets over the past two decades, the 
phasing out of most export taxes,
2 and the conversion of many non-tariff trade barriers into 
tariffs, the task of measuring the extent of distortions to goods markets is made much easier in 
that attention can focus on import tariffs and agricultural subsidies. In principle services trade 
and foreign investment distortions also could distort incentives in the agricultural and industrial 
sectors, but they are ignored here partly because much controversy still surrounds their 
measurement and how they should be modelled, and partly because they do not seem destined 
for major reform under the current Doha Development Agenda of multilateral trade reform by 
WTO members. 
The latest release of the GTAP dataset, Release 6.05, includes estimates of bilateral 
tariffs and of domestic and export subsidies as of 2001 for 87 countries and country groups 
spanning the world. This is a substantial improvement over Version 5 of the GTAP dataset, 
which relates to 1997. The new protection data come from a joint CEPII (Paris)/ITC (Geneva) 
project. The product of this joint effort, known as MAcMaps, is a HS6 tariff level detailed 
database on bilateral protection that integrates trade preferences, specific and compound tariffs 
and a partial evaluation of non-tariff barriers such as tariff rate quotas (TRQs).
3 The new GTAP 
database has lower tariffs than the previous database. This is because of the inclusion of bilateral 
trade preferences, as well as the major reforms between 1997 and 2001 such as continued 
implementation of the Uruguay Round agreements, and China’s progress towards WTO 
                                                 
2   Apparently only a few minor export taxes remain – see Piermartini (2004) and also Thiele (2004). 
3   More information on the MAcMaps database is available in Bouët et al. (2004) and at 
http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/macmap.htm. For details of its incorporation into the GTAP Version 6 






accession (which alone contributed to the ratio of global exports plus imports to GDP rising from 
44 to 46 percent over those four years). 
According to this dataset, the average import tariff for agriculture and food in 2001 was 
16.0 percent for high-income countries and 17.7 percent for developing countries, while for 
manufactures other than textiles and clothing it was 8.3 percent for developing countries and just 
1.3 percent for high-income countries (Table 1). The averages of course obscure large variations 
across countries and commodities, and are poor indicators of overall assistance to farming. For 
example, if high-income countries’ tariffs on temperate farm products are at a near-prohibitive 
100 percent, but zero on tropical products such as coffee, those countries’ import-weighted 
average agricultural tariff could be quite low even though agricultural value added in those rich 
countries had been enhanced substantially. Consider also the case of a developing country with a 
strong agricultural comparative advantage in all but one small farming industry, and with high 
tariffs to stave off import competition for that industry and for all manufacturing industries. 
Overall agricultural value added would be depressed by that structure of protection, yet the 
import-weighted average tariff protection for agriculture would be high and possibly above that 
for manufactures. A third case is where the non-agricultural primary sector receives a similar 
level of import protection as the farm sector and less than the manufacturing sector, but is much 
more export-focused: trade reform may cause it to expand at the expense not only of 
manufacturing but also of farming. Hence it is not possible to say from the tariff data in Table 1 
whether developing country policies have overshot in terms of moving away from an anti-
agricultural bias, even though the ratio of agricultural to all goods tariffs in that table is well 






equilibrium model to estimate the net effects of all sectors’ distortions on agricultural markets 
and net farm income, to which we now turn.  
  
The global LINKAGE model for assessing sectoral and welfare effects of trade distortions  
 
The model used for this analysis is the World Bank’s global dynamic computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) model, known as LINKAGE (van der Mensbrugghe 2004). It is a relatively 
straightforward CGE model but with some characteristics that distinguish it from standard 
comparative static models such as the GTAP model (described in Hertel 1997). A key difference 
is that it is recursive dynamic, so while it starts with 2001 as its base year it can be solved 
annually through to 2015. The dynamics are driven by exogenous population and labor supply 
growth, savings-driven capital accumulation, and labor-augmenting technological progress as 
assumed for the Global Economic Prospects report in World Bank (2005). In any given year, 
factor stocks are fixed. Producers minimize costs subject to constant returns to scale production 
technology, consumers maximize utility, and all markets – including for labor – are cleared with 
flexible prices. There are three types of production structures. Crop sectors reflect the 
substitution possibilities between extensive and intensive farming; livestock sectors reflect the 
substitution possibilities between pasture and intensive feeding; and all other sectors reflect 
standard capital/labor substitution (with two types of labor: skilled and unskilled). There is a 
single representative household per modeled region, allocating income to consumption using the 
extended linear expenditure system. Trade is modeled using a nested Armington structure in 






domestic goods and aggregate imports, and then aggregate import demand is allocated across 
source countries to determine the bilateral trade flows. 
There are several sources of protection in the model. The most important involves 
bilateral import tariffs. There are also bilateral export subsidies. Domestically, for numerous 
countries subsidies are important in agriculture, where they apply to intermediate goods, outputs, 
and payments to capital and land. 
Three closure rules are used. First, government fiscal balances are fixed in any given 
year.
4 The fiscal objective is met by changing the level of lump sum taxes on households. This 
implies that losses of tariff revenues are replaced by higher direct taxes on households. Second, 
the current account balance is fixed. Given that other external financial flows are fixed, this 
implies that ex ante changes to the trade balance are reflected in ex post changes to the real 
exchange rate. For example, if import tariffs are reduced, the propensity to import increases and 
additional imports are financed by increasing export revenues. The latter typically is achieved by 
a real exchange rate depreciation. Finally, investment is driven by savings. With fixed public and 
foreign saving, investment comes from changes in the savings behavior of households and from 
changes in the unit cost of investment. The latter can play an important role in a dynamic model 
if imported capital goods are taxed. Because the capital account is exogenous, rates of return 
across countries can differ over time and across simulations. The model only solves for relative 
prices, with the numéraire, or price anchor, being the export price index of manufactured exports 
                                                 
4  For the sake of simplicity they are fixed in US$ terms at their base year level, minimizing potential 







from high-income countries. This price is fixed at unity in the base year and throughout the 
projection period to 2015. 
The version of the LINKAGE model used for this study is based on the GTAP database and 
is solved with 27 regions and 25 sectors. There is a heavy emphasis on agriculture and food, 
comprising 13 of the 25 sectors, and a focus on the largest commodity exporters and importers. 
 
Effects of current protection policies 
 
The LINKAGE model provides a baseline projection of the world economy first to 2005 
and then to 2015 assuming no other policy changes. Deviations from that baseline in 2015, due 
to total liberalization from 2005, are then examined. The first step requires a pre-simulation to 
bring the world as depicted in the GTAP dataset in 2001 up to the start of 2005. In terms of 
policy shocks, we include only key multilateral commitments in that pre-simulation, namely the 
final stages of Uruguay Round implementation including the phase-out of the Multifibre 
Arrangement (MFA), the accession of China and Taiwan to the WTO, and the eastern 
enlargement of the European Union from 15 to 25 members. The impacts of those three reforms 
are non-trivial: had they not been implemented, the dynamic gains in 2015 from freeing global 
merchandise trade would have been an extra $64 billion per year. Nearly half of that difference is 
due to the removal of MFA quotas and hence should be considered part of the Uruguay Round’s 
legacy. The effect of those reforms on tariffs can be seen by comparing the estimates at the start 
of 2005 in Table 2 with those for 2001 in Table 1. 
The next step is to measure the prospective effects of removing all agricultural subsidies 






economy in turn, so as to assess the impact of own-country policies as in Jensen, Robinson and 
Tarp (2002). But since each country’s policies are there to some extent because of other 
countries’ policies, and are more likely to be reformed if other regions were to do so at the same 
time (as following a multilateral trade negotiation such as the Doha Agenda), a perhaps more-
appropriate question is how each region’s welfare, agricultural markets and farm incomes would 
change if all trade distortions were to be removed together. Our LINKAGE model’s answer to that 
question is that it would lead to global gains by 2015 of $287 billion per year. The distribution 
across regions of that economic welfare (or equivalent variation in income) gain, reported in 
Table 3, suggests two-thirds would accrue to high-income countries. However, as a share of 
national income, developing countries would gain more, with an average increase of 0.8 percent 
compared with 0.6 percent for high-income countries. The results vary widely across developing 
countries, ranging from little impact in the case of Bangladesh and Mexico to 4 or 5 percent 
increases in parts of East Asia.  
The second column of numbers in Table 3 shows the amount of that welfare gain due to 
changes in the international terms of trade for each country. For developing countries as a group 
the terms of trade effect is negative, reducing somewhat the gains from improved efficiency of 
domestic resource use (especially in China and India). When the terms of trade effect is netted 
out, it generates the numbers in parentheses in the final column of Table 3 which can be 
interpreted as an indication of the relative degree of inter-sectoral distortion in each economy. By 
that indicator, developing countries are more than twice as wasteful of their resources as are 
high-income countries – and low-income countries are nearly three times as wasteful. 
There are several ways to decompose the real income gains from full global trade reform 






impacts of developing country liberalization versus industrial country liberalization in different 
economic sectors; another is to decompose by policy instrument. The latter gives results very 
similar to those reported in Hertel and Keeney (2005), who estimate that market access barriers 
explain 93 percent of the welfare effects of agricultural policies, with domestic support and 
export subsidy removal contributing only 5 and 2 percentage points, respectively.
5   
Our results when decomposed by sector are provided in Table 4. They suggest global 
liberalization of agriculture and food markets contributes 63 percent of the total global gains 
(similar to Hertel and Keeney’s 66 per cent). This is consistent with the high tariffs in agriculture 
and food versus other sectors shown in Table 1, but is nonetheless remarkable given the low 
shares of agriculture in global GDP (4 percent) and global merchandise trade (9 percent). Seven-
tenths of those gains are accounted for by the farm policies of high-income countries, and those 
policies also account for the majority of the overall gains from trade reform to high-income 
countries. Notice also that developing country gains from high-income country reform are only 
half as large from textiles as from agricultural policies.  
The full liberalization results suggest little change in the high-income countries’ shares of 
global output and exports of processed food, beverages and tobacco. Only for primary 
agriculture are the changes noticeable: the export share falls by more than one-quarter, from 53 
to 38 percent (including intra-EU trade) – but the output share falls by only one-sixth, from 30 to 
25 percent (Table 5). For developing countries, their share of global output of food and 
agricultural products increases 2 percentage points and their share of global exports of those 
goods rises 4 percentage points. In absolute terms, agricultural and food output in high-income 
                                                 
5   Hoekman, Ng and Olarreago (2004) reach a similar conclusion from estimating the effects of halving each of 






countries would decline but only by 0.1 percent per year over the projection period to 2015 
following a move to free trade in all merchandise, instead of rising by 1.6 percent per year.  
The impact of full trade reform on agricultural and food output and trade is shown for 
each country/region in Table 6, where it is clear that exports are enhanced much more than 
output. As a consequence, the global share of agricultural and food production exported rises, 
from 9.5 to 13.2 percent (or from 6.6 to 11.6 percent when intra-EU trade is excluded). The 
increase in exports of those goods from developing countries would be a huge $191 billion per 
year more. Certainly Latin America accounts for a large part of that increase, but all regions’ 
exports expand and even low-income countries would sell an extra $36 billion worth of such 
goods per year (an increase of 52 percent). Also of interest is what happens to food imports: 
middle-income countries as a group would see them growing less rapidly than farm exports, 
while low-income countries’ imports of those goods would grow only as fast as their exports of 
food and agricultural products, leaving their food and agricultural self sufficiency ratio 
unchanged. Even for high-income countries that ratio would fall only two percentage points, 
although it is concentrated in primary agricultural products where the fall is seven points. The 
opposite is true in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, while for South Asia and China their 
agricultural self sufficiency levels would fall only one percentage point despite their expansion 
in exports of labor-intensive manufactures (Table 7).  
Would freeing global merchandise trade lead to more trade gain for developing countries 
than for high-income countries, given the latter’s high protection rates in agriculture and textiles? 
This question is pertinent for trade negotiators, who often think more in terms of the boost to the 
value of trade than to changes in economic welfare. Table 8 suggests any imbalance of that sort 






two protected sectors exports would increase more for developing than for high-income 
countries, but for other manufactures the trade growth for the two regions would have the 
opposite bias. Also, much of the developing countries’ trade growth is with other developing 
countries. Hence for merchandise trade as a whole, developing countries would sell an extra 
$318 billion to high-income countries under free trade whereas high-income countries would sell 
an extra $290 billion to developing countries. A small amount of services trade liberalization by 
developing countries would be sufficient to close that gap, if full reciprocity were sought.  
How big would be the consequences of reform for farm output and employment growth 
over the implementation period post-2004? Table 9 shows what that annual growth to 2015 
would be in the baseline (no policy changes post-2004) and what it would be if all distortions to 
merchandise trade were removed. If there were completely free trade, farm output would decline 
(instead of growing slightly) in just the EU and Japan while growing slower in a few other highly 
protective countries – but, for most countries/regions shown in Table 9, farming activities would 
expand. This contrasts with the rhetoric suggesting farm protection cuts would cause a major 
collapse of protected sectors. 
The farm employment picture is somewhat different. Typically, economic growth leads 
to declines in not only the relative importance of agriculture (for reasons explained in Anderson 
1987 and Martin and Warr 1993) but also in absolute numbers employed in farming once a 
country reaches middle-income status. Thus it is not surprising that numerous middle- and high-
income countries are projected to lose farm jobs over the next decade in the baseline scenario of 
Table 9. For the most protected farm sectors, that rate of farm employment decline would more 






farm employment would grow a little faster, allowing developing countries to absorb more 
workers on their farms.  
Such reform also raises the share of agricultural and food production that is exported 
globally, from 9.5 percent in the baseline to 13.2 percent under free merchandise trade (Table 
10). Even in the protected countries this ratio rises a little, because farm resources would move 
within the sector from import-competing to more-competitive farming activities. 
The relatively small percentage changes in net national economic welfare hide the fact 
that redistributions of welfare among groups within each country following trade reform can be 
much larger. This is clear from the impacts on real rewards to labor, capital and land that are 
reported in Table 11. The results also strongly support the expectation from trade theory that 
returns to unskilled labor rise substantially in developing countries, and by more than wages of 
skilled workers, which in turn rise more than earnings from produced capital. That is, full reform 
would be likely to improve equity and reduce poverty in developing countries, given that the vast 
majority of their poor earn their income as unskilled laborers (including as farmers). For high-
income countries, again consistent with standard trade theory, skilled workers gain more than 
unskilled workers. Those European and Northeast Asian farmers renting agricultural land would 
benefit from a large fall in farm rental costs, more or less offsetting the fall in prices for their 
output, while earnings of landowners in those countries would lose.
6  
Those changes in factor rewards assume labor is mobile between sectors. In the most 
densely populated developing countries full liberalization would encourage more farm workers 
to take up now-more-rewarding work in labor-intensive manufacturing and service activities, so 
                                                 
6   Their loss is relative to the no-reform baseline, which ignores the fact that such farm landowners have long 






value-added in agriculture would fall not only in economies where it has been highly protected 
(Europe, Northeast Asia and the US) but also in South Asia – whose trade policies have a 
slightly pro-agricultural bias according to the GTAP database, and which enjoys expanding 
market access abroad for those non-agricultural products in which the region has a strong 
comparative advantage.
7 All other developing country regions would see a rise in net farm 
income though (as would the developed country Cairns Group members of Canada, Australia 
and New Zealand). That is true of China not only because it has already reduced much of its 
agricultural protection as part of its reforms associated with its accession to WTO at the end of 
2001, but also because it faces extremely high tariff barriers in it export markets for farm 
products (Jen, Laborde and Martin 2005). And it is true in particular of the Sub-Saharan African 
region, even when southern Africa is separated out, despite the fact that there are numerous net 
food importing and preference-receiving exporting countries in that region (see Anderson, 
Martin and van der Mensbrugghe (2005) for more details). Table 12 shows separately the 
contributions of high-income and developing countries’ policy reforms to that outcome, from 
which it is clear that most of the effect comes from one or other of those reforms, with only a 
minor contribution to the residual from non-agricultural sectors. Those value added changes are 
due in considerable part to the changes in import and export prices for farm and other products, 
which are summarized in Table 13. 
Of particular importance to Brazil and some Sub-Saharan African countries is the case of 
cotton, which is receiving special attention in the WTO’s Doha Development Agenda following 
the Cancun Trade Ministerial in 2003 and the Dispute Settlement case that went against the US 
                                                 
7   The move to free trade would boost South Asia’s ratio of production to consumption in textiles and clothing 






in 2004. Under full trade and subsidy liberalization, global cotton markets would change 
dramatically: the value of production would fall by one-third or more than $5 billion per year in 
high-income countries (mostly in the US), and the value of their exports would fall by $3.6 
billion. The world totals would hardly change though, as developing country output and exports 
of cotton would expand by about the same amounts, with Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South 
Africa) enjoying more of that gain than any other region (Table 14).   
The bottom line, therefore, is that if all current distortions to world trade in merchandise 
were phased out over the rest of this decade then, according to the latest GTAP database and the 
Linkage model, by 2015 developing country agricultural production, employment and real net 
income would be greater than without such reform. And it would be greater in most regions 
within the developing country group, the exceptions being South Asia and Eastern Europe where 
import tariffs are higher for agricultural than non-agricultural goods. This does not necessarily 
mean that if each individual developing country were to unilaterally liberalize we would find 
farmers benefiting in all cases except in South Asia and Eastern Europe; but if we were to run 
those many individual model simulations we may well get that result also, since, as is apparent 
from Table 3, terms of trade effects of reforms by others are usually dominated by efficiency 
gains from own reforms except for the least-distorted economies.  
 
Lessons, implications and areas for further research  
 






•  The potential gains from global trade reform are large, including for developing countries 
and especially when they participate in the reform, despite its adverse terms of trade 
impact on many developing countries;  
•  Agriculture is where the greatest gains from liberalization would occur;   
•  Liberalization would cause farm output and farm employment to be greater in developing 
countries relative to the baseline, except in South Asia;  
•  It is the poorest people that appear to be most likely to gain from global trade 
liberalization, namely farmers and unskilled laborers in developing countries; and, in 
particular, 
•  Net farm income would be enhanced in all developing country regions other than South 
Asia (where job growth would be greater in non-farm activities). 
To realize that potential gain, it is in agriculture that by far the largest cuts in bound 
tariffs and subsidies are required. The political sensitivity of farm support programs, coupled 
with the complexities of the measures introduced in the Uruguay Round Agreement on 
Agriculture and of the modalities set out in the Doha Framework Agreement of July 2004, make 
that a daunting task. However, with global gains of the order of $290 billion per year at stake 
from removing trade barriers, even if no reforms were forthcoming in services, and even if the 
counterfactual is the status quo rather than protectionist backsliding, the political will needs to be 
found to bring about such reform. The WTO’s Doha Development Agenda is an obvious vehicle 
for moving down this path (Anderson and Martin 2005a, b). Multilateral cuts in tariff bindings 
are especially helpful because they can lock in previous unilateral trade liberalizations that 
otherwise would remain unbound and hence vulnerable to reversals to higher protection; and 






agreements and thereby reduce the risk of trade diversion from those bilateral or regional 
arrangements. It remains to be seen whether the political will can be mustered to bring that Doha 
round to a successful conclusion. 
The results concerning the extent of bias in trade policies against or in favor of 
agriculture are very much dependent on the levels of distortion in the GTAP database of course. 
Those for high-income countries are reasonably reliable, thanks in large part to the protection 
estimates provided by the OECD (2005 and earlier). Currently available estimates of 
(particularly agricultural) trade distortions and subsidies in developing countries are less reliable. 
Nor are many estimates provided in the GTAP database of export taxes or tax equivalents of 
quantitative restrictions and bans on exports. A new project at the World Bank is seeking to 
provide better estimates of that sort. Distortions to factor markets, particularly labor, may also 
have an important influence on the results for some countries if they were to be included in the 
model. More-challenging tasks would be to also provide estimates of distortions to services trade 
and foreign direct investment, so as to see what impact they also have on agricultural and other 
goods production and trade; and to estimate the poverty consequences of such reforms (building 
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Table 1: Import-weighted average applied tariffs, by sector and region, 2001 



















b  16.0 1.0 7.5 1.3 2.9
 Developing countries  17.7




   Middle-income countries  16.5 4.6 16.8 7.3 8.9
   Low-income countries  22.2 14.2 17.9 14.5 15.9
   East Asia and Pacific  26.3 17.8 8.6 10.5
   South Asia  33.9 20.1 22.2 23.5
   Europe & Central Asia  14.8 10.7 4.1 6.0
   Middle East & N. Africa  14.1 27.1 7.2 9.8
   Sub-Saharan Africa  18.2 23.7 10.5 12.6
   Latin America & the Carib.  10.3 5.1 11.3 7.1 7.7
World total   16.7 10.2 3.5 5.2
 
a Forestry, fishing, fuels, minerals and non-ferrous metals. 
 
b Intra-EU15 trade is ignored in calculating weights for determining tariff averages.  
 






Table 2: Import-weighted average applied tariffs, by sector and country, 2005 

















World 15.2      9.3 3.1 
High-income 15.9      7.3 1.2 
Australia & NZ  2.6 0.3  3.3  13.9  4.1 
EU25 + EFTA   13.9 13.2  14.7 5.1  1.7 
United States  2.4 2.3  2.5  9.6  0.9 
Canada  9.0 1.2 14.1  8.7  0.5 
Japan  29.3 48.0  20.8 9.0  0.4 
S. Korea & Taiwan  53.0 84.5  22.4 9.2  3.6 
Hong Kong & Sing.  0.1 0.0  0.2  0.0  0.0 
         
Developing countries
b 14.2      14.3 7.1 
Middle-income 12.1      13.6 6.0 
Argentina  7.1 5.6  7.8  11.1  10.1 
Brazil  5.0 2.4  9.0  14.7  9.7 
China  10.3 9.9 11.0  9.6  5.5 
Mexico  10.3 10.8  9.7 7.8  4.3 
Russia  13.5 14.6  12.8  15.8  7.8 
South Africa  8.6 5.9 10.6  21.9  5.4 
Thailand  16.7 12.7  19.2  16.4  7.6 
Turkey  16.6 16.4  17.0 3.8  1.2 
Rest of East Asia  13.4 18.6  9.0 8.7  3.5 
Rest of LAC  10.8 9.2 11.8  12.9  8.4 
Rest of ECA  15.7 10.4  19.5 9.3  3.2 
M. East &N. Africa  13.1 8.2 18.3  23.9  7.2 
         
Low-income 22.0      17.9 14.1 
Bangladesh  12.7 7.4 21.2  29.9  16.2 
India  49.9 25.7  75.6  26.5  24.2 
Indonesia  5.0 4.3  6.2  8.0  4.3 
Vietnam  37.1 13.1  44.8  29.1  12.3 
Rest of South Asia  21.1 14.2  32.0 6.6  14.3 
Selected SSAfrica
a  11.8 10.2  13.0  12.5  7.5 
Rest of SSAfrica  21.2 18.0  23.6  26.2  14.0 
       Rest of the World  11.8 1.9 18.7  5.6  8.9 
 
a The Selected Sub-Saharan African countries (for which national modules are available 
in the LINKAGE Model) include Botswana, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, 
Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
 
b Numbers in parentheses are the averages at the start of 2005 following WTO accession 
by China and end of MFA.  
 
Source: Authors’ projections from the GTAP database Version 6.05 using the World 






Table 3: Impacts on real income from full liberalization of global merchandise 
trade, by country/region, 2015 
 








income due just 
to change in 
terms of trade 
($billion) 
Gain due to 
improved 
efficiency of 
resource use net 
of terms of trade 
effect 
($billion) 





        
Australia and New Zealand  6.1  3.5  2.6  1.0   (0.4) 
EU 25 plus EFTA  65.2  0.5  64.7  0.6   (0.6) 
United States  16.2  10.7  6.5  0.1   (0.0) 
Canada  3.8  -0.3  4.1  0.4   (0.4) 
Japan  54.6  7.5  47.1  1.1   (1.0) 
Korea and Taiwan  44.6  0.4  44.2  3.5   (3.5) 
Hong Kong and Singapore  11.2  7.9  3.3  2.6   (0.8) 
Argentina  4.9 1.2  3.7  1.2   (0.9) 
Bangladesh  0.1 -1.1  1.2  0.2   (2.4) 
Brazil  9.9 4.6  5.3  1.5   (0.8) 
China  5.6 -8.3  13.9  0.2   (0.5) 
India  3.4 -9.4  12.8  0.4   (1.5) 
Indonesia  1.9 0.2  1.7  0.7   (0.7) 
Thailand  7.7 0.7  7.0  3.8   (3.4) 
Vietnam  3.0 -0.2  3.2  5.2   (5.5) 
Russia  2.7 -2.7  5.4  0.6   (1.2) 
Mexico  3.6 -3.6  7.2  0.4   (0.8) 
South Africa  1.3 0.0  1.3  0.9   (0.9) 
Turkey  3.3 0.2  3.1  1.3   (1.2) 
Rest of South Asia  1.0  -0.8  1.8  0.5   (0.9) 
Rest of East Asia  5.3  -0.9  6.2  1.9   (2.2) 
Rest of LAC  10.3  0.0  10.3  1.2   (1.2) 
Rest of ECA  1.0  -1.6  2.6  0.3   (0.8) 
Middle East and North Africa  14.0  -6.4  20.4  1.2   (1.7) 
Selected SSA countries
  1.0  0.5  0.5  1.5   (0.8) 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  2.5  -2.3  4.8  1.1   (2.2) 
Rest of the World  3.4  0.1  3.3  1.5   (1.5) 
High-income countries  201.6 30.3  171.3  0.6   (0.5) 
Developing countries   85.7 -29.7  115.4  0.8   (1.1) 
     Middle-income countries  69.5 -16.7  86.2  0.8   (1.0) 
     Low-income countries  16.2 -12.9  29.1  0.8   (1.4) 
   East Asia and Pacific  23.5  -8.5  32.0  0.7   (1.0) 
   South Asia  4.5  -11.2  15.7  0.4   (1.4) 
   Europe and Central Asia  7.0  -4.0  11.0  0.7   (1.1) 
   Sub-Saharan Africa  4.8  -1.8  6.6  1.1   (1.5) 
   Latin America and the Caribbean  28.7  2.2  26.5  1.0   (0.9) 
World total  287.3  0.6  286.7  0.7   (0.7) 
 
a Numbers in parentheses refer to that due to efficiency gains net of terms of trade effects. 






Table 4: Regional and sectoral source of gains from full liberalization of global 
merchandise trade, developing and high-income countries, 2015 
 
(relative to the baseline scenario) 
 
  Gains by region in $billion  Percent of regional gain 










        
Developing countries liberalize:        
Agriculture and food  28 19 47 33  9 17 
Textiles and clothing  9 14 23 10  7  8 
Other merchandise  6 52 58  7 26 20 
All sectors  43 85  128 50 42 45 
        
High-income countries liberalize:        
Agriculture and food  26  109  135 30 54 47 
Textiles and clothing  13 2  15  15 1 5 
Other merchandise  4 5 9 5 2 3 
All sectors  43  116  159 50 57 55 
        
All countries liberalize:        
Agriculture and food  54  128  182 63 64 63 
Textiles and clothing  22 16 38 25  8 14 
Other merchandise  10 57 67 12 28 23 
All sectors  86 201 287 100 100 100 
 
a Small interaction effects are distributed proportionately and numbers are rounded to 
sum to 100 percent 
 




















       
Output       
—  baseline  70 40 62 35 
— free trade  75  40  65  35 
      
Exports
a      
—  baseline  47 34 63 30 
— free trade  62  40  67  32 
 
a Including intra-EU trade 
 







Table 6: Impacts of full global trade liberalization on agricultural and food output 
and trade, by country/region, 2015 
 
(relative to baseline) 
 
  
$billion  Percent change relative to 
baseline 
   Exports Imports Output Exports Imports Output 
                 
Australia and New Zealand  18.0  1.4  27.9  38.0  23.0  20.5 
EU 25 plus EFTA  21.7  103.5  -185.8  -10.8  39.3  -12.3 
United States  18.4  16.5  30.7  11.6  25.6  0.0 
Canada  14.6  6.9  7.2  40.2  54.3  4.8 
Japan  2.8  34.7  -91.7  60.4  169.7  -18.4 
Korea and Taiwan  33.2  12.3  -0.4  600.2  189.8  20.2 
Hong Kong and Singapore  7.0  1.5  7.4  115.2  7.6  35.4 
Argentina 10.4  0.7  12.2  44.2  36.9  11.5 
Bangladesh 0.8  0.4  -2.5  60.9  15.6  0.8 
Brazil 38.0  2.8  66.4  120.6  48.4  34.0 
China  15.1 24.1  -9.9  145.6 27.3  -0.9 
India 5.1  13.4  -23.8  53.2  165.4  -3.7 
Indonesia 3.6  1.9  4.5  32.2  23.5  2.4 
Thailand 5.6  5.2  5.3  29.2  57.2  4.7 
Vietnam 1.2  3.3  -2.1  13.9  170.4  -13.3 
Russia 0.7  4.4  -7.8  15.4  22.3  -5.4 
Mexico 11.9  6.7  6.2  66.0  52.9  2.2 
South Africa  2.4  1.1  1.4  55.9  40.2  4.9 
Turkey 4.3  4.3  -0.1  109.4  140.3  0.5 
Rest of South Asia  2.9  3.7  -1.5  57.1  83.3  -1.8 
Rest of East Asia  9.4  5.8  7.4  61.7  50.7  6.8 
Rest of LAC  36.0  9.6  37.0  68.1  42.3  11.7 
Rest of ECA  9.2  10.9  -22.2  106.0  90.5  -1.6 
Middle East and North Africa  13.2  17.5  -7.8  64.1  43.1  -1.2 
Selected SSA countries  4.5  1.3  5.3  50.0  74.4  9.2 
Rest of Sub Saharan Africa  9.5  8.1  -4.1  45.4  79.2  -0.6 
Rest of the World  8.2  5.8  2.9  168.3  123.3  4.4 
High-income countries  115.8  176.7  -204.7  15.7  65.5  -5.3 
Developing countries  191.9  131.0  66.8  67.4  51.5  2.2 
     Middle-income countries  156.1  93.1  88.2  72.7  41.9  3.2 
     Low-income countries  35.8  37.9  -21.4  52.3  99.3  -1.0 
   East Asia and Pacific  34.8  40.4  5.2  54.4  35.5  0.1 
   South Asia  8.9  17.5  -27.8  55.1  122.9  -3.0 
   Europe and Central Asia  14.2  19.6  -30.0  79.7  62.6  -1.9 
   Sub Saharan Africa  16.4  10.5  2.6  47.7  71.6  2.1 
   Latin America and the Caribbean  96.3  19.8  121.8  75.7  46.1  13.8 
World total (excluding intra-European trade)  307.7  307.7  -137.8  36.3  59.8  -1.3 
 
Source: Authors’ World Bank LINKAGE model simulations  
 
Table 7: Impact of global liberalization on self sufficiency
a in agricultural and other products, selected regions, 2015 
 


























Rice  101 78 100 103 92 82  99 99 102 103 100 108 
Wheat  160 140 91 94 55 39  92 127 99 98 92 93 
Other grains  119 134 93 88 101 102  107 109 99 99 89 42 
Oil seeds  135 79 90 106 158 278  188 249 100 102 3 3 
Sugar  97 66 102 115 110 120  126 173 100 100 56 35 
Plant-based fibers  121 84 96 103 389 698  95 107 89 92 94 96 
Vegetables and fruits  89 80 103 105 139 144  147 185 97 91 98 98 
Other crops  86 87 112 111 168 176  142 134 105 106 19 17 
Livestock  104 104 98 98 103 103  103 102 99 99 96 95 
Other natural resources  94 94 104 104 126 127 129 129 97 97 93 93 
Fossil fuels  81 80 124 125 152 160 119 118 71 61 88 85 
Processed meats  101 93 99 111 97 139  105 134 108 117 91 88 
Vegetable oils and fats  98 91 102 108 89 76  113 107 77 34 96 91 
Dairy products  104 103 90 94 78 79  95 96 97 98 66 61 
Other food, beverages & tob.  98 101 102 99 102 96  108 108 112 110 99 98 
Textiles  97 98 102 101 81 68 89 83 132 137 102 101 
Wearing apparel  68 61 162 176 89 73 95 84 527 792 228 260 
Leather products  60 56 139 144 92 66 110 92 173 191 158 167 
Chemicals rubber & plastics  105 106 92 91 75 71 82 77 95 94 94 91 
Iron and steel  101 101 99 98 106 107 102 95 98 95 94 93 
Motor vehicles and parts  103 104 91 87 66 76 105 105 97 89 92 82 
Capital goods  103 103 95 95 48 47 86 83 82 82 105 106 
Other manufacturing  96 97 107 106 121 116 100 95 101 98 112 113 
Agriculture and food  100 98 100 102 109 113 112 122 100 98 95 94 
    Agriculture  101 94 100 102 119 125 122 136 100 99 94 93 
    Processed foods  99 99 101 101 100 100 106 113 103 95 97 96 
Textile and wearing apparel  79 76 118 121 84 69 95 85 151 166 128 132 
Other manufacturing  99 100 101 100 98 98 96 92 92 89 102 102 
a Self sufficiency is defined as domestic production as a percentage of domestic consumption measured in value terms at fob prices. 
Source: Authors’ World Bank LINKAGE model simulations  
 
Table 8: Changes in bilateral trade flows from full global liberalization 
a, 2015 
(Difference in bilateral trade flows at FOB prices in 2015 compared to the baseline, $billion) 
 






countries        
Exporter:                Agriculture and food 
World  314 186  128 
High-income  104 54  50 
Developing  210 133 77 
                Textiles and clothing 
World  164 79  85 
High-income  47 8  40 
Developing  117 71  46 
                 Other manufacturing 
World  595 227  368 
High-income  312 112  200 
Developing  284 114  168 
                All merchandise trade 
World  1073 492  581 
High-income  463 174  290 
Developing  610 318  291 
 
 
a Aggregations exclude intra-EU trade 
 






Table 9: Agricultural output and employment growth, baseline and full liberalization, 
2005-2015 
 
(annual percent growth rate between 2005 and 2015) 
 











   
            
Australia & New Zealand  3.5  5.2    0.4  1.9 
EU 25 plus EFTA  1.0  -1.5    -1.8  -3.9 
United States  2.2  1.3    -0.8  -2.1 
Canada  3.5  5.2    0.2  1.9 
Japan  0.5  -4.3    -2.7  -6.5 
Korea and Taiwan  2.2  0.1    -1.3  -3.9 
Hong Kong and Singapore  2.8  3.3    0.0  0.2 
Argentina  2.9 5.1    0.9 3.3 
Bangladesh  4.2 4.4    1.1 1.2 
Brazil  3.3 6.1    1.1 4.0 
China  4.3 4.3    0.8 0.7 
India  4.3 4.1    1.0 0.6 
Indonesia  3.0 2.9    -0.7 -0.7 
Thailand  -0.1 1.3    -4.6 -3.7 
Vietnam  5.8 6.1    3.9 3.5 
Russia  1.5 1.0    -2.3 -2.7 
Mexico  3.9 4.1    2.0 2.3 
South Africa  2.5 3.3    0.0 0.8 
Turkey  3.0 2.6    -0.5 -1.2 
Rest of South Asia  4.8  4.8    2.0  1.9 
Rest of East Asia  3.7  3.5    0.2  -0.1 
Rest of LAC  4.4  6.6    1.9  3.8 
Rest of ECA  3.3  3.3    0.0  -0.1 
Middle East & N. Africa  4.0  4.0    1.5  1.4 
Selected SSA countries  5.3  5.7    3.0  3.3 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  4.6  4.8    2.2  2.5 
Rest of the World  5.0  6.4    2.4  3.5 
High-income countries  1.6  -0.1    -1.5  -3.1 
Developing countries (WB)  3.9 4.2    1.0 1.2 
     Middle-income countries  3.7  4.1    0.4  0.3 
     Low-income countries  4.4  4.5    1.2  0.9 
   East Asia and Pacific  4.0  4.0    -0.5  -0.8 
   South Asia  4.4  4.2    1.5  1.4 
   Europe and Central Asia  3.0  2.9    2.3  2.6 
   Middle East and N. Africa  4.0  4.0    1.7  3.4 
   Sub-Saharan Africa  4.5  4.9    0.2  0.0 
   Latin America and Carib.  3.8  5.8    0.4  1.9 
World total  3.2  2.9    -1.8  -3.9 
 










 Baseline  Baseline 
Full global 
liberaliz’n  
 2001 2015 
      
Australia & New Zealand  33.3  37.2  42.7   
EU 25 plus EFTA  16.7  17.3  17.6   
EU 25 plus EFTA (excl. intra-EU25)  4.0  5.1  7.7   
United States  6.3  7.9  9.2   
Canada  24.5  29.5  40.0   
Japan  0.9  1.2  2.3   
Korea and Taiwan  4.4  4.8  26.5   
Hong Kong and Singapore  26.0  30.0  47.8   
Argentina 21.6  25.2  32.5   
Bangladesh 1.7  3.6  5.7   
Brazil 15.3  17.3  28.9   
China 3.3  0.9  2.2   
India 3.5  3.0  4.7   
Indonesia 11.9  10.0  12.9   
Thailand 30.2  28.2  34.6   
Vietnam 23.9  26.9  35.3   
Russia 6.1  5.5  6.7   
Mexico 5.6  7.8  13.2   
South Africa  16.0  12.7  18.8   
Turkey 9.6  6.0  12.4   
Rest of South Asia  6.0  6.2  9.9   
Rest of East Asia  16.1  14.6  22.1   
Rest of LAC  13.9  18.1  27.1   
Rest of ECA  2.4  1.7  3.7   
Middle East & N. Africa  5.2  6.7  11.2   
Selected SSA countries  13.2  18.1  25.4   
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  11.2  15.8  23.3   
Rest of the World  6.6  7.0  17.7   
High-income countries  5.8  7.5  11.6   
Developing countries  7.5  6.9  11.6   
     Middle-income countries  7.6  6.6  11.4   
     Low-income countries  7.3  7.9  12.4   
   East Asia and Pacific  7.2  4.1  6.5   
   South Asia  3.8  3.6  5.7   
   Europe and Central Asia  3.7  2.7  5.0   
   Sub-Saharan Africa  12.5  15.8  23.1   
   Latin America & the Caribbean  12.7  15.9  24.8   
World total  9.5  9.5  13.2   
World total (excl. intra-EU25)  6.6  7.2  11.6   
 























user cost  CPI 
       
Australia and New Zealand  3.1  1.1  -0.3  17.4  1.2 
EU 25 plus EFTA  0.0  1.3  0.7  -45.4  -1.3 
United States  0.1  0.3  0.0  -11.0  -0.4 
Canada  0.7  0.7  0.4  22.8  -0.9 
Japan  1.3  2.2  1.1  -67.4  -0.1 
Korea and Taiwan  6.5  7.1  3.8  -45.0  -0.7 
Hong Kong and Singapore  3.2  1.6  0.3  4.4  1.1 
Argentina  2.9 0.5  -0.7  21.3 0.3 
Bangladesh  1.8 1.7  -0.2 1.8  -7.2 
Brazil  2.7 1.4 1.6  32.4 2.2 
China  2.2 2.2 2.8  -0.9  -0.4 
India  2.8 4.6 1.8  -2.6  -6.0 
Indonesia  3.3 1.5 0.9 1.0 0.5 
Thailand  13.2 6.7 4.2  11.4  -0.6 
Vietnam  25.3 17.6 11.0  6.8 -2.3 
Russia  2.0 2.8 3.5  -2.2  -3.3 
Mexico  2.0 1.6 0.5 2.8  -1.4 
South  Africa  2.8 2.5 1.8 5.7  -1.6 
Turkey  1.3 3.4 1.1  -8.1  -0.3 
Rest of South Asia  3.7  3.2  0.1  0.1  -2.7 
Rest of East Asia  5.8  4.2  5.2  -0.9  -1.6 
Rest of LAC  5.7  1.4  -0.4  17.8  -1.2 
Rest of ECA  2.3  4.2  2.1  -0.3  -2.6 
Middle East and North Africa  4.1  4.1  2.6  2.4  -3.1 
Selected SSA countries  6.0  1.6  0.0  4.6  0.4 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  8.2  6.5  2.2  5.2  -5.0 
Rest of the World  4.4  2.7  1.1  6.3  -1.4 
High-income  countries  0.6 1.1 0.5  -20.0  -0.6 
Developing countries  3.5 3.0 1.9 0.9  -1.7 
     Middle-income countries  3.2  2.6  1.9  2.2  -1.1 
     Low-income countries  4.2  3.9  1.9  -1.0  -4.0 
World  total  1.2 1.5 0.8  -0.8  -0.8 
 
a Nominal factor prices deflated by the consumer price index (CPI). 
 
b The user cost of capital and land represents the subsidy inclusive rental cost. 
 






Table 12: Effects of full liberalization of global agricultural and other merchandise trade 
on agricultural value added, by country/region, 2015 
 
(relative to baseline, 2001 dollars and percent) 
 
                                                                                           $billion                                                        percent 
  
Developing 
agr & food 
High-
income 





Ag&Food All  goods 
Australia and New Zealand  2.5  3.2  6.4  10.1  13.0  25.6 
EU 25 plus EFTA  7.3  -42.0  -39.1  4.9  -28.3  -26.4 
United States  5.1  -20.7  -18.2  4.2  -17.0  -15.0 
Canada  2.0  1.4  3.4  13.3  9.6  23.3 
Japan  0.2  -17.7  -17.7  0.4  -39.6  -39.5 
Korea and Taiwan  0.5  -10.1  -9.5  1.7  -35.4  -33.3 
Hong Kong and Singapore  0.1  0.1  0.1  3.6  5.0  7.5 
Argentina  0.4 4.9 6.1  2.1 27.4  33.8 
Bangladesh -0.4  0.2  -0.5  -3.3  1.7  -4.4 
Brazil  0.0 15.1 15.1  0.1  46.2 46.3 
China -16.3  13.3  0.3  -3.8  3.1  0.1 
India -17.3  2.9  -17.1  -8.2  1.4  -8.1 
Indonesia  -0.1 1.0 0.8  -0.4  3.3 2.7 
Thailand  1.1 3.1 3.8  7.2 20.4  25.0 
Vietnam  0.9 0.3 0.8  14.5  5.7  13.6 
Russia -1.8  0.7  -1.4  -8.4  3.2  -6.5 
Mexico  -3.8 7.9 0.9  -9.9 20.9 2.5 
South  Africa  0.1 0.4 0.5  1.3  7.8 9.6 
Turkey -2.9  0.9  -2.0  -10.3  3.0  -7.2 
Rest of South Asia  -1.7  1.2  -0.6  -3.7  2.7  -1.3 
Rest of East Asia  -1.4  1.2  -0.2  -5.5  4.6  -0.7 
Rest of LAC  1.9  19.7  22.9  2.5  26.0  30.2 
Rest of ECA  -2.1  1.4  -1.1  -3.3  2.3  -1.8 
Middle East and North Africa  -4.8  6.2  0.3  -4.4  5.6  0.3 
Selected SSA countries  0.4  1.1  1.5  2.7  6.5  9.1 
Rest of Sub Saharan Africa  -0.7  3.0  2.3  -1.7  7.2  5.4 
Rest of the World  0.7  2.5  3.1  3.4  13.2  16.4 
High-income  countries  17.6 -85.8 -74.6  4.6  -22.3 -19.4 
Developing  countries  -47.9 87.1 35.6  -3.9  7.0  2.9 
Middle-income  countries  -29.6 74.8 45.3  -3.4  8.7  5.3 
Low-income countries  -18.2  12.3  -9.7  -4.8  3.2  -2.5 
East Asia and Pacific  -15.8  18.9  5.5  -3.2  3.8  1.1 
South Asia  -19.4  4.4  -18.1  -7.2  1.6  -6.8 
Europe and Central Asia  -6.8  3.0  -4.5  -6.0  2.6  -4.0 
Middle East and North Africa  -4.8  6.2  0.3  -4.4  5.6  0.3 
Sub Saharan Africa  -0.2  4.5  4.3  -0.3  7.1  6.7 
Latin America and the Caribbean  -1.4  47.7  45.0  -0.9  29.0  27.4 
World total  -30.3  1.3  -39.0  -1.9  0.1  -2.4 
 






Table 13: Impact of full liberalization of global merchandise trade on indexes of real export 
and import prices 
 
(Change in export and import price in 2015 relative to baseline, percent) 
 
                                                                                                              Export prices                                        Import prices 
 Ag  &  All Ag  &  All 
   food  merchandise food  merchandise 
Australia and New Zealand  4.5  2.2  2.0  0.1 
EU 25 plus EFTA  1.0  -0.1  -0.1  -0.4 
United  States  10.1 0.5 1.5  -0.4 
Canada  2.4 -0.3  3.4 -0.2 
Japan  -5.0 0.9 1.6 0.0 
Korea  and  Taiwan  -14.9 0.8 5.0 0.2 
Hong Kong and Singapore  1.6  1.8  2.0  0.2 
Argentina  2.8 2.9 3.3 0.3 
Bangladesh  -6.5  -5.5 5.9 0.7 
Brazil  6.0 3.0 2.6  -0.2 
China  -0.2  -0.3 7.4 1.0 
India  -3.5  -6.1 5.0 0.1 
Indonesia  1.8 0.5 8.0 1.3 
Thailand  2.5  -0.2 1.4 0.1 
Vietnam  4.8  -0.8 3.7 0.3 
Russia  -2.7  -1.9 4.8 0.2 
Mexico  1.7  -1.5 8.3 0.3 
South  Africa  -0.6 -0.1  1.6 -0.3 
Turkey  -0.5  -0.4 9.0 0.0 
Rest of South Asia  0.2  -2.1  3.8  0.1 
Rest of East Asia  0.3  -0.1  3.6  0.6 
Rest of LAC  2.0  -0.3  3.5  0.1 
Rest of ECA  -2.6  -2.5  1.8  -0.8 
Middle East and North Africa  -1.0  -1.8  4.5  0.1 
Selected SSA countries  2.6  1.4  1.5  -0.6 
Rest of Sub Saharan Africa  -1.4  -3.1  3.7  -0.1 
Rest of the World  0.1  -0.5  -0.8  -0.3 
High-income  countries  3.2 0.3 0.9  -0.3 
Developing  countries  1.2  -0.8 5.0 0.4 
     Middle-income countries  1.7  -0.6  5.2  0.4 
     Low-income countries  -0.1  -2.2  4.1  0.3 
   East Asia and Pacific  1.6  -0.2  6.2  0.8 
   South Asia  -2.7  -5.1  4.8  0.1 
   Europe and Central Asia  -2.2  -1.8  4.2  -0.3 
   Sub Saharan Africa  -0.4  -1.5  3.0  -0.2 
   Latin America and the Caribbean  3.1  0.0  4.8  0.1 
World total (excluding intra-European trade)  3.9  0.1  3.1  0.0 
 






Table 14: Impact of full global liberalization on output and exports of cotton, by region, 
2015 
 
(2001 $ billion) 
 
    Output Exports
a 
    
    United States    -4.7 -3.5 
EU 25 plus EFTA    -1.4 -1.0 
Other high-income    1.0 0.9 
    
    Sub-Saharan Africa    2.2 1.9 
Latin America    1.2 0.7 
Other developing    1.8 1.6 
World total    0.1 0.6 
 
a Including intra-EU trade 
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